US relations with North Korea: Confusion over negotiations

When Mike Pence mentioned the “Libyan solution,” he was referring to an agreement the US concluded with Libyan leader Muhammad Gaddafi in 2003. The agreement stipulated that in exchange for Gaddafi stopping his nuclear ambitions and allowing international weapons inspectors into the country, sanctions against Libya would be lifted and the country would be able to join the international community again.

However, for Kim Jong-un, Libya has a very different connotation and has in fact spurred him to accelerate the development of nuclear weapons ever since 2011, the year when Gaddafi was killed by Libyan rebels.

In Kim’s mind, the Libyan example was a blueprint of what can happen to a dictator who negotiates with Western powers and gives up his nuclear ambitions. In 2011, eight years after the agreement with the US was signed, a US led NATO coalition sided with Libyan insurgents and helped to overthrow Gaddafi.

This was a defining moment for Kim Jong-un, who decided to accelerate his nuclear program, increased the frequency of nuclear tests and finally was able to demonstrate to the world that North Korea had become a nuclear power.

What is likely to happen going forward?

The key goal for Kim is to get the sanctions, which are crippling his economy, lifted. Indeed, the development of Kim’s nuclear weapons has resulted in the toughest economic sanctions ever pronounced against Pyongyang as the US managed to persuade China, North Korea’s only ally and its largest trading partner, to side with the international community on sanctions against Kim’s regime.

It is however very unlikely that Kim would give up his nuclear arsenal, which he has worked so hard to develop. There are three reasons for this:

1. His nuclear arsenal gives him much more leverage in any ongoing or future negotiations.
2. It acts as a powerful deterrent against an attack on North Korea and any attempt to topple Kim’s regime.
3. The recent termination of the nuclear deal with Iran by Donald Trump has shown Kim that agreements offer no guarantees and can be dissolved by a new administration. This will have made him even more reticent to give up his nuclear arsenal.

For all these reasons, Kim has consistently referred to abandoning his nuclear program as opposed to giving up his nuclear arsenal. In return for the latter, he will most likely make demands such as the removal of US troops from South Korea, which he knows the US is unlikely to accept.

This leads to two possible outcomes:

• Either there will be no agreement, irrespective of whether a meeting between Kim and Donald Trump takes place. This would result in the continued isolation of the North Korean regime as was the case for the past 30 years.
• The second possibility consists in the US accepting that Kim keeps all or some of his nuclear arsenal. If this was the case, a peace treaty with South Korea and a return of North Korea to the international community would be a distinct possibility.

Worth reading in this context